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ABSTRACT
The adoption of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy in Brazil was
a convenient way to replace exchange rate rule by targeted inflation in an effort to
anchor inflation expectations.
This paper briefly evaluates the inflation target experience from three
viewpoints: reasons behind the success, difficulties regarding forecasting and the
risks ahead. It analyses the factors behind the success as well as the way initial
doubts and a second round of mistrust were successfully dealt with. It looks at the
empirical difficulties to estimate a reliable Demand Function and examines evidence
on the persistence of high interest rates as captured by a Taylor rule. It points out to
possible signaling problems in the transmission mechanism that might lead to a
weakening of the confidence in the strategy in the future. Section 3 draws conclusions
on risks that emerged together with favorable outcomes of the first year.
There has been a substantial progress in the overall confidence in monetary
policy's management. Inflation targeting has certainly played a relevant role in this
gain. However, it looks like we have not got rid of the "thin ice economy" riding in
the post-Real era, since dependence of inflation on foreign exchange availability is
still high. Thus the Brazilian economy is still excessively dependent on international
liquidity fluctuations. As it happened in the past six years, because of the combination
of the size of interest rate movements with the persistence of effects, a double barrel
destructive effect on investment and banking, good scenarios tend to be too good, and
bad scenarios are seen as terrible for assets markets.
An appendix note was written by Thomas Wu on the problem of finding a
measurement of the output gap for the Brazilian economy.
JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS E520, E650
                                          
1 Based on Notes prepared for the Panel Discussion at the Central Bank Seminar on Inflation Targeting,
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draft. He thanks Renata Assis for editorial help and Yann Grandjean for the preparation of figures and
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INTRODUCTION
One year ago, the adoption of inflation targeting as a strategy for conducting
monetary policy in Brazil was seen, above all, as a convenient way to replace the
exchange rate rule as a nominal anchor. Convenience stemmed basically from the
replacement of expected devaluation by inflation target. The combination of
backward-looking inflation expectations with exchange rate overshooting, following
the release of the exchange rate rule, could lead to rampant inflation requiring, once
again, the drastic use of monetary brakes. After four years of (ex-post) real interest
rates in the 20% range, fiscal dominance was feared to be an obstacle to the re-
habilitation of monetary instrument for the control of inflation. It was hoped that the
new exchange rate regime would put an end to the high interest rate – high fiscal
deficit nexus which had turned out to be incompatible with the resumption of
investors’ confidence and economic growth. Actual results turned out to be a lot more
than that.
Inflation, measured by IPCA, the consumer price index chosen for the target,
went down from an annual rate of 12% in the first half of 1999 to 5% annual rate in
the first half of 2000. Expected annual inflation for the 12 months starting on July 1,
1999 went from approximately 10% to 5% in the 12 following months starting on July
1, 2000. Expected GDP annual growth went from -3% at the time of the definition of
the strategy to 5% one year later. The nominal exchange rate went from 1.77 per US$
one year ago to 1.80 per US$ and the trade balance from US$ 201 million in June
1999 to US$ 833 million in June 2000.
Table 1










OUTPUT (t/t-4) 0,72% -0,17% 3,08% 4,60%
INFLATION (IPCA % annualized) (actual) 12,03% 4,27% 3,94% 2.67%
 may
(expected) 15,87% 18,11% 6,64% 6,93%
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE 38,20% 27,20% 18,90% 19,30%
EXCHANGE RATE (end of period) 1,7220 1,7695 1,7473 1,8000
TRADE BALANCE (US$ millions) -817,00 201,00 26,00 833,00
PSBR (primary, %GDP) 0,69% 1,55% 3,31% 3.52%
april
Source : IBGE, Secex, BCB
Behind the figures, there has been a perceptible improvement in the way the
Central Bank communicates its actions and intentions to financial markets, to press, to
politicians and to society as a whole, which led to a consistent convergence of
markets’ expectations towards Central Bank targets. The overall good quality of the
quarterly Inflation Report is one of the positive factors behind this increased5
transparency, but other vehicles, as well, have favored a better transmission of
ideas behind monetary policy actions. The result has been a better public
perception of the quality of policy-making by Central Bank, and the choice of the
monetary policy strategy has a lot to do with it.
This paper briefly evaluates the experience from three viewpoints: reasons
behind the success, difficulties regarding forecasting and the risks ahead.
Section 1 analyses the factors behind the success in contrast with the
skepticism of a large part of the analysts at the time of inception of the new strategy. It
examines how initial doubts were mastered and how the second round of mistrust,
which accompanied a gradual but steady sliding of the floating rate in the second half
of 1999, was dealt with. Section 2 looks at the empirical evidence captured by the
Phillips curve on the difficulties related to the estimation of a reliable Global Demand
Function and examines the persistent effect of high interest rates as captured by a
Taylor rule. It points out to a possible signaling problems in the transmission
mechanism which might lead to a weakening of the confidence in the strategy in the
future. Section 3 draws conclusions on the risks that emerged together with the
favorable outcomes of the first year. Finally, the article includes an appendix note by
Thomas Wu on the problem of finding a measurement of the output gap for the
Brazilian economy.
SECTION 1 — THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS
The decision to formally adopt an inflation targeting strategy following the
change in exchange rate policy had three immediate consequences.
First, it was a good show of economic diplomacy. At the time of the inception,
the Central Bank team had to face a new phase of negotiations with the IMF, whose
officials were, at best, skeptical of inflation targeting as a reasonable commitment. As
evidence, we may recall the simple fact that the Net Domestic Assets plus a minimum
of foreign exchange reserves were kept as conditionalities. But the move attracted
invaluable support from many external partners, not only from multilateral
institutions, but also from other countries’ monetary authorities. At that time, financial
markets' confidence was low and the threat of a systemic crisis was still present in
most analysts’ scenarios. The choice of an alternative that seemed state-of-the-art
policy strategy facilitated communication with other central banks officials. Should
government-to-government cooperation be necessary once again, as part of the effort
to avoid the eventual return of disruptive default scenario, this could turn out to be a
good investment in the effort to bring back markets' confidence.
Secondly, it allowed Central Bank to focus on inflation as explicitly
formalized by means of a legal document (a government decree), which announced
the inflation target intervals of 8% to 12% for 1999 and 4% to 8% in 2000. At that
time, a public demonstration of the government's commitment to inflation control was
highly beneficial.
Thirdly, it helped to remove part of the high inflation practices and procedures
of monetary policy and public debt management which remained as fossils of the high
inflation regime. Part of these remains of high inflation era was the belief that a
combination of extraordinarily high interest rates and automatic repurchase rules were
essential to induce private wealth managers to maintain their demand for public
bonds.6
These three facts may be listed as part of the success in the first year. On
the other hand, the absorption of the strategy has not been smooth over the last
12 months. Part of the difficulties was present at the time the policy was launched. At
the end of the first half of 1999, several conditions recommended extra care in
handling the new policy. To name a few:
a) The confidence crisis following devaluation was far from over. Fundamentals of
the Brazilian economy were not clearly improving, markets for Brazilian debt
were illiquid and fund managers as well as banks’ strategists still kept their busy
ears on the ground looking high and low for the sounds of the next crisis;
b) Fiscal dominance had been aggravated by the attempts to defend the former
exchange rate rules. The fiscal improvement in the short run was obtained by
means of expenditure repression, generating pressures that tended to narrow the
scope for corrective monetary policy in case of new turbulence. The new strategy
was not meant to deal with that. Bad fiscal results could hinder the efficacy of
announcements of pre-emptive tightening of monetary policy, which is considered
an interesting advantage of inflation targeting as it is perceived by the general
public;
c) The fall in terms of trade could suggest more real devaluation was needed in the
short run than originally expected, just when a widespread view of an overvalued
exchange rate could help damper inflation expectations;
d) Finally, a more general and yet, by and large, unresolved doubt remained. One
was entitled to wonder whether the government’s commitment to an inflation
target strategy would go beyond the initial motivation due to tactical reasons.
Economic growth measured by 4-quarter moving average was visible at the
end of the year but the figures around 2% were short of a full-fledged recovery near
what could be expected by the President’s political support in Congress as desired
levels. As may be observed in figure 1, output, measured by quarterly GDP, had
stagnated in the first two quarters following the exchange rate fluctuation, at a very
low level, since recession had began one year before, at the time of the Russian crisis.
Since there is no Congress law or political contract granting the Central Bank a clear
mandate either to focus in the targeted rate of inflation, or full freedom in the choice
of instruments, poor growth performance could still be a political obstacle to
strengthening the institutional setting of monetary policy.7
Figure 1
Growth, Consumer Prices and the Exchange Rate

























Source : IBGE, BCB
To make matters even worse, in the second half of 1999, the dynamics of the
exchange rate and the interest rate in Brazilian economy turned out to be unpleasantly
similar to the pre-devaluation period. Figure 2 shows the devaluation trend from May
to October. In spite of the fact that interest rates remained high, while expected
inflation declined, the exchange market players were led to suspect that further
devaluation was forthcoming, as terms of trade continued to slide. US interest rates
were still expected to rise for a few quarters, and the level of the Central Banks’
foreign exchange reserves was still too small to allow intervention, given the reserve
targets set in the agreement with the IMF. This trend was only reverted when, after a
favorable mission review prompted by the good performance in the primary surplus,
the IMF granted the Central Bank more freedom to use its reserves to intervene in the
foreign exchange market. High real interest rates, sliding exchange rate, recession and
negative (although improving) trade balance contributed to reinforcing skepticism. At
the same time, futures markets, shown in Figure 3 (both for interest rates and
exchange rates), reinforced the view of some analysts, among them Gustavo Franco
[2000], the former president of the Central Bank and a strong defender of the previous
exchange rate sliding mechanism, that devaluation “would not solve the confidence
problem”. If this were the case, default-signaling interest rates were the only tools to
prevent self-fulfilling short-selling rallies on the real. This view was based on a
combination of price-elasticity pessimism with an evaluation of declining political
support from the President’s political allies in Congress to the economic policy.8
The slow response of the trade balance to devaluation, in spite of the low
activity level growth, fueled the pessimism. This state of affairs might signal the
dangers of another round of devaluation plus higher interest rates, more recession and
worsening of the fiscal balance that would certainly disrupt confidence in the political
survival of the new strategy.
Figure 2
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Central Bank is allowed to
intervene in US$ market
Central Bank frustrates
market expectations
Source : BCB, BM&F
An important battle, however, was won in another front. Besides a significant
fall in the volatility of the exchange rate, there was a very fast reduction in the
dispersion of the multitude of price indices available to measure Brazilian inflation.
The use of a variety of price index to measure inflation is a characteristic inherited
from the high inflation experience. Among fifteen price indices that have been used to
measure inflation, we selected eleven, to illustrate their relationship with the exchange
rate. Figure 4 shows their behavior from January 1999 to June 2000. Following the
change in relative prices which reflects the exchange rate devaluation in real terms,
the other side of the confidence build-up may be read from the relative behavior of the
different indices. The eleven indices, depicted in Figure 4, fall into three categories.
Wholesale indices, which are the most sensitive to what is happening to the price of
tradables and contain many list prices which do not actually correspond to effective
transactions; CPIs, which reflect the low share of imports in the consumption basket
and are loaded with non-tradable services and public tariffs; and the so-called
“general” price index calculated by Vargas Foundation, defined as averages of
wholesale and consumption prices, originally conceived to mimic short run
movements of the GDP deflator. Convergence of wholesale to consumer prices and
not the opposite is another way to illustrate the ability to float without igniting high
inflation mechanisms. Figure 4 shows the behavior of three groups of price indices,
the most widely used in inflation analyses in Brazil. One and a half year after
devaluation, the extreme lines are wholesale (the high group, reflecting the behavior10
of tradable goods) and CPIs (the lowest group, reflecting what was happening to
the consumption basket), whereas the mid-range is occupied by the Vargas
Foundation’s “general indices”.
Figure 4
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Source : IBGE, FGV, Fipe, BCB
However, the success of the inflation targeting strategy in bringing about low
inflation and lowering expected devaluation, did not make clear the transmission
mechanisms at work. In particular, it is hard to tell at this point how much of the
slowdown in expected inflation was the result of favorable agricultural prices (at first,
export prices, like soybeans and coffee, the same prices that have been responsible for
a deceptive behavior of the trade balance); how much could be attributed to the effect
of industrial recession in reverting the initial impact of wholesale industrial prices;
and how much could be credited to successful management of the exchange rate.
Goldfajn (2000) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) examined the role of the
determinant of the pass-through coefficients and found that several characteristics of
the Brazilian economy in 1999 in common with other successful experience helped
explain the inflation slowdown after the first hump in the exchange rate.
As to the secondary movement of exchange rate and prices, which occurred in
the second half of 1999, however, things seem more complex. The behavior of
exchange rate and inflation in the second half of 1999 might be interpreted as the
outcome of the Central Bank’s decision to frustrate market’s expectations (figure 3)
and keep interest rates high (in the 19% level) in the fourth quarter of 1999. But in
view of the decrease in the output gap in the fourth quarter, one is left with doubts
concerning the transmission mechanism.
3
                                          
3 This point is discussed in Goldfajn (2000).11
In particular, the above observations bring back some old questions
concerning how different is the new strategy from the exchange-based control of
inflation, if only after more freedom to sell reserves the virtuous circle of lower
exchange rate, and smaller expected inflation, could finally lead to the reduction of
interest rates. Actually, it might be argued that only after a better evaluation of the
Brazilian economic policy could be read in the market for Brazilian debt, the Central
Bank was cleared to sell reserves and only then to initiate the path which led from the
exchange rate to the lowering of interest rates. Brazilian risk measured by the C-bond
yield strip (JP Morgan) went down from 15.4% to 13% from October to December. 
4
Finally, it should be mentioned that negative supply shocks have been at work
during a good part of the period. The price of oil, for example, doubled and export
revenue frustrated expectations concerning the improvement in the trade balance, in
part due to unfavorable commodity prices.
5 But a combination of more favorable
expectations concerning the exchange rate and the effect of food prices on the
consumer price indices in the summer prepared a more confident picture for the first
quarter of 2000. Only then could the Central Bank reduce interest rates, with a good
help from the fiscal results that prompted another favorable IMF evaluation report.
SECTION 2 — DOUBTS AND THE EVIDENCE FROM QUARTERLY DATA
Two doubts arise from the description of events in the previous section which
could be faced with a closer look into the data. The first one regards the links between
the response of inflation and the output gap to interest rates. The second one is related
to the interest rate responses of the Central Bank to the economic data.
A way to take a closer look was to ignore the short span for which data are
available in face of the recent experience with low inflation (and even more recent
with inflation targeting). Data limitations notwithstanding, one proceeds to examine
the estimates of some basic relations which appear in the Central Bank model, as
described in the Inflation Report (April 2000).
6
The links between inflation and output, as well as, between interest rate and
output are modeled by a Phillips curve and a Demand Function. One problem hard to
solve is related to the output gap measure.
An illustrative summary of the estimated coefficients for the Phillips curve,
and a Demand Function (IS) are shown in Tables 2 and 3, where all estimates are from
quarterly data in order to make use of the higher frequency possible for GDP series.
The Phillips relation, for the 1995.I to 1999.IV does not capture the relevant impact of
the narrowing of the output gap on inflation for well-known reasons. At the beginning
and at the end of the sample period, inflation was declining while output was
recovering. But in both events the reason was not Central Bank’s action to stimulate
demand but public’s confidence that the Central Bank had political support to do its
job. This entails a very poor fit, which is presented in two versions. Table 3 presents
the results obtained in the estimation of the “backward-looking” Phillips Curve
                                          
4  On what happened to other measures of Brazilian risk, see Garcia (2000) calculations in a comment
paper presented in the same seminar.
5 Terms of trade fell by 7% from January 1999 to January 2000.
6 A brief review of the model, as described, in the first Inflation Report pointing to some consequences
of its data limitations was done in Carneiro (2000).12
(containing lagged inflation) with 3 different specifications
7. The first one is a
totally unrestricted model and the second imposes long run neutrality. Both
results present a positive output elasticity.
If we impose, as restriction, an output elasticity obtained by a simple
regression estimate, which appears as .326 in the third column, the lagged inflation
coefficient increases. In all cases, the exchange rate pass-through to prices remains in
the range .08 to 0.10, a good evidence that the coefficient is robust to the restrictions
imposed.
Table 2
Phillips Curve ( backward looking specification ) for different
restrictions
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
INFLATION(-1) 0,324 8,0% 0,546 0,6% 0,484 8,0%
INFLATION(-2) 0,376 2,5% 0,365 5,3% 0,102 2,5%
OUTPUT GAP*(-1) 0,087 35,2% 0,149 16,0% -0,326 -


















Dependent variable: Inflation 
Adjusted sample: 1995.I - 2000.I
Attempts to estimate an IS curve from quarterly data for the short period after
stabilization have not been successful, even if we are willing to tolerate a disastrous
loss of degrees of freedom. Better results may be obtained with a longer series for
quarterly GDP but several structural breaks have to be dealt with, and the sensitivity
of the output gap coefficient to how we deal with the breaks and to the choice of filter
for definition of “normal output” poses some problems to the interpretation of the
coefficients, which are beyond the scope of these notes and are analyzed elsewhere.
8
Table 4 contains some illustrative estimates for the IS curve. The first one follows the
specification in the Bogdanski-Tombini-Werlang paper. It has a poor fit, not exactly a
surprise in view of the non-significant real interest coefficient, but when seasonality is
taken care of by mean of seasonal dummies, a better fit is obtained, and the real
interest rate coefficient becomes significant. Two other regression estimates have been
added, which restrict the NFSP coefficient to be -1, but this leads to a poorer fit. But it
                                          
7 The results for a “forward looking” Phillips Curve, containing an expected inflation variable, is
presented in the appendix.
8 Carneiro e Wu (2000), mimeo.13
should be noted that in all exercises the coefficient of the lagged interest rate
remains remarkably stable.
A better result estimate is available for a Taylor Rule, what comes as a surprise
if we consider that interest rate movements have, by and large, been determined by
external events and we have not included any external variable thereby allowing the
exchange rate to capture the impacts, even when the exchange rate was bound within a
narrow band. Table 3 presents illustrative results.
A high degree of inertia in the interest rate rule is noted, as expected,
suggesting that once the interest rate is increased, the recessive impact is to be felt for
a long time due to difficulties in finding a reasonable way to lower interest rate
without sending inadequate optimistic signals to asset holders. On the other hand, the
fiscal bruises and the investors’ scars have been unusually severe but have not been
included in the demand curve, so one may tend to underestimate the indirect fiscal
impact of the interest rate shocks in such models which use the primary surplus as the
fiscal variable in the IS function.
Table 3
Different specifications for the IS curve
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CONSTANT -0,029 20,5% -0,008 55,3% -0,018 36,8% -0,005 70,5%
OUTPUT GAP(-1) 0,365 15,3% 0,647 1,1% 0,689 6,0% 0,636 1,3%
OUTPUT GAP(-2) -0,081 76,1% 0,097 69,0% 0,042 91,0% 0,112 65,0%
REAL INTEREST RATE(-1) 0,527 27,0% 0,517 4,0% 0,641 8,6% 0,483 5,3%
PSBR(-1) -0,341 36,6% -0,215 23,7% -1,000 - - -
DUMMY1 - - 0,012 22,8% 0,005 71,2% 0,014 17,1%
DUMMY2 - - -0,054 0,1% -0,057 0,7% -0,053 0,1%










WITHOUT DUMMIES UNRESTRICTED PSBR RESTRICTED PSBR OMMITED
25,0% 86,8% 66,0% 85,2%
6,3% 79,7% 51,4% 78,9%
1,712 2,296 0,971 2,157
-4,057 -5,508 -4,657 -5,491
-3,809 -5,110 -4,309 -5,143
1,334 12,198 4,525 13,459
30,0% 0,0% 0,9% 0,0%
Dependent variable: Output Gap (Linear Trend, Data since 1992)
Adjusted sample: 1995.I - 2000.I14
Figure 5
The shocks persistence: Selic interest rate evolution (log of)
Source : BCB
One explanation found for the difficulties may have relation with persistence
in the shocks. As mentioned earlier, if the interest rate changes have been dominantly
motivated by external shocks under an exchange rate rule regime, it should be no
surprise that it has reacted so little to the output gap variables. Is it possible to find an
evidence of this persistence? Quarterly data for the Selic rate are shown in Figure 5,
and suggest that a good deal of persistence is present in the interest rate. Has inflation
targeting decreased persistence? Tables 4 and 5 may help us find an answer.
Regressions of the Taylor Rule were run with coefficient dummies for the different
post-shock periods (4 in the first one, 3 in the second one, where the first two periods










94.3 95.1 95.3 96.1 96.3 97.1 97.3 98.1 98.3 99.1 99.3 00.1
94.3-95.1 95.2-98.2 97.4-98.3 98.4-00.115
Table 4
The Persistence of Shocks: estimation of a Taylor Rule
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CONSTANT 0,016 2,7% 0,006 56,1%
INTEREST RATE(-1) 94.III - 00.I 0,694 0,0% - -
INTEREST RATE(-1) 94.III - 95.I - - 0,708 0,0%
INTEREST RATE(-1) 95.II - 97.III - - 0,776 0,0%
INTEREST RATE(-1) 97.IV - 98.III - - 0,887 0,0%
INTEREST RATE(-1) 98.IV - 00.I - - 0,969 0,0%
INFLATION DEVIATION* 0,208 41,6% 0,345 25,4%










* INFLATION - EXPECTED INFLATION








Dependent Variable: Interest Rate (Selic)
Adjusted sample : 1994.IV - 2000.I
Figure 6
Nominal Interest Rate (Selic)
TAYLOR RULE (4 BREAKS)











94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 97.1 97.2 97.3 97.4 98.1 98.2 98.3 98.4 99.1 99.2 99.3 99.4 00.1
SELIC ESTIMATED SELIC RESIDUAL
Source : BCB
The conclusion is that the lagged interest coefficient increased steadily in each
shock from .708 to .969, from the Mexican Crisis to the Brazilian Crisis with a gap16
coefficient ever higher and with smaller variance. The results are practically the
same if we use three instead of four periods. Looking at the residuals of the last
regression, there is no sign that inflation targeting may have decreased interest rate
persistence in the first year of experience. And this is certainly an obstacle to
overcome.
SECTION 3 — CONCLUSIONS
There has been a substantial progress in the overall confidence in the
management of monetary policy. Inflation targeting has certainly played a relevant
role in this gain. However, it looks like we have not got rid of the "thin ice economy"
riding in the post-Real era, since dependence of inflation on foreign exchange
availability is still high. Thus the Brazilian economy is still excessively dependent on
the fluctuations of international liquidity. As it happened in the past six years, because
of the combination of the size of interest rate movements with the persistence of
effects, a double barrel destructive effect on investment and banking, good scenarios
tend to be too good, and bad scenarios are seen as terrible for assets markets.
Yet, we seem to know a lot less than we would like to about the impact of
interest rate on activity level, which is crucial to clarify an important factor of
investors’ confidence, namely how high interest rates have to be raised when a
slowdown of the economy is necessary. In the recent crises, which are the immediate
source for data variation, the experience has been disruptive. This means that if a
slowdown of economic output is to be obtained by monetary means, investors are
entitled to fear that this may require an interest shock which may prompt a banking
crisis or a moratorium in the public debt, with all their destabilizing effects on
financial markets. This should be a part of the investors’ risk calculations when the
purchase of Brazilian debt instruments is considered.
If we believe that a long “inertia” will be present in the downward path of
interest, as suggested by the empirical results of Section 3, we find that inflation
targeting has a long way to go before we may trust the strategy’s effect on the stability.
One important task is thus to find a regime for the interest rate – output response
nexus which is credible and do not require bad news generation or destructive
scenarios. But in the transition, other policy measures are desirable in order to prevent
the present experiment from being prematurely aborted on account of excessive
political abrasion.
  In the present situation, the impulse-response patterns implicit in such
coefficients suggest a hysterical pattern. That is, a system in which both the reaction of
the Central Bank to bad outcomes and the reaction of the economy to Central Bank’s
action may be too strong and therefore surprises, up or down, may play a de-
stabilizing role.
Part of this phenomenon may be attributed to the roles financial intermediaries
have been playing in the Brazilian economy after stabilization. Until a “normal”
financial system is at work, that is, one in which the credit and the asset markets
effects are apt to be the main channels for the transmission of monetary impulses to
the economy, the exchange rate channel seems to be playing a more important role
than the usual measures of the degree of opening of the economy, such as the share of
imports, as total expenditure would suggest.17
In the present situation, this means that exchange rate movements tend to
reflect more the reasons behind capital flows (which tend to be more volatile
than could be justified by fundamentals) than overall sustainability of the current
account. Two consequences are to be noted. First, fluctuations in the exchange rate
may aggravate adverse external shocks, an argument that is always present when the
degree of financial opening of the economy is been reviewed. The second one is that
the political support to pursuit fundamentals improvement tends to be fragile. Two
policy consequences should be examined. The first one is the high priority to the
organizational and legislative initiatives to reinforce the credibility of credit markets
so that competition and a better regulation of responsibilities of creditor and debtor
may favor the lengthening of private debt at reasonable costs and smaller default risk.
The second one is that a high level of the Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves
should be desired as a means to compensate excessive fluctuation.
Only very recently competition among banks to supply credit began to have an
effect on spreads. Given the risk of self-fulfilling pessimism in exchange rate markets,
the monetary policy framework for the next years will have to find not only smoother
ways to react to adverse shocks, but will have to prevent boom-and-bust credit cycles
that might fuel either a speculative investment boom or a panic run on Brazilian
currency.
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APPENDIX 1: CONSTRUCTING THE OUTPUT GAP SERIES
The endogenous activity level variable in an IT model is the output gap.
Although some countries have an official data for the output gap, the official activity
level measurement in Brazil is a quarterly GDP index. So the first step before trying to
estimate the elasticities involved in output, inflation and interest rates is to construct
an appropriate output gap measurement. Although the concept of output gap is a well-
defined one in economic theory, there is a vast literature on econometrical
methodologies to construct it.
The most usual methodologies for constructing a potential GDP series from a
GDP index are the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the linear trend, the Kalman filter and
estimates of production functions. Bogdanski, Tombini and Werlang (2000) reports
that for the Brazilian quarterly GDP data the best results are obtained using the linear
trend and the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Although the results are very similar, there are
some differences to be considered. By definition the linear trend implies a constant
potential output growth, which means that we can recover output growth estimates
based on output gap forecasted by our IT model. On the other hand, for the HP filter
the potential output growth is higher in recoveries and smaller in contractions, which
implies a smoother output gap series.
It is also known that, despite the chosen methodology, the construction of the
potential output series is also sensitive to the sample span. We consider three different
time span, they all end in 2000.1 (most recent data available) but differ in the starting
date. The first time span considered starts at 1994.3, which means that only the post-
Real Plan data is considered. But one must not forget that the output trend is a long
term phenomenon, so it would be more reasonable to choose the largest span
available. The longest time series for the quarterly GDP starts in 1990. There is also
another series that starts in 1980, but since it was calculated in another methodology,
it will not be considered. So our second choice of time span starts at 1990.1. One
historical peculiarity about the 1990 and 1991 years lead us to a third time span. The
Collor Plan has driven our economy into a deep recession, perhaps the worst of the
nineties. One may fear that the inclusion of this period data would affect the position
of the potential output trend, since it represents almost 20% of the number of
observations. Then, our third time span considered starts at 1992.1.
We constructed the output gap series using two methodologies, the linear trend
and the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and considering for each methodology three different
time span, 1990.1-2000.1, 1992.1-2000.1 and 1994.3-2000.1. Results are shown in
Figure A.1 (dotted line). Because of the strong seasonal pattern present in the series,
quarterly dummy variables are included. The full line in each graph in Figure A.1 is
the output gap seasonally adjusted by dummy variables.
Before choosing one of the six output gap series constructed, we must define
what we mean by “best”. A reasonable criteria is to define best methodology as the
one which creates an output gap series that matches our historical economic
perception of the period being analyzed. This means that we can rule out
methodologies that constructs positive output gaps in periods we believe the economy
was overheated and negative output gaps in periods we believe the activity level was
low.
In Figure A.1 we can notice that the Hodrick-Prescott filter, for every time
span chosen, accuses a warm activity level for the first quarter of 2000, warm enough19
to justify higher interest rates if one have in mind any kind of Taylor Rule. Since
this was not the perception for that period, we believe the Hodrick-Prescott filter
is not appropriate. The same happens for the linear trend if we consider the time span
1994.3-2000.1. So we are left with the linear trend and two time spans, 1990.1-2000.1
or 1992.1-2000.1. Notice that for the largest time span, the 92/93 activity level is too
depressed. So the output gap series that best describes our historical economic
perception of the period involved is constructed with a linear trend and considering
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APPENDIX 1.1: Different output gap series seasonally adjusted with
dummy variables21
One relevant question after this exercise is to ask how sensitive are our
estimates to the choice of the methodology. The previous analysis made can be
viewed somehow as a “calibration” of the level of the potential output, or choosing
where to cross the zero output gap line. If all the six series have very similar
movements differing only in their position in relation to the origin, the elasticities
estimates should be robust to the choice of methodology. The estimated elasticities are
the angular coefficients of linear projections of the output gap on, say, inflation or on
interest rate. The linear coefficient of this linear projection is the one that should be
most affected. Table A.1 illustrates this point reporting estimates of a simple IS curve
controlled with dummies variables. The output gap elasticity with respect to the real
interest rate calculated for the six different series remains in a range of 0.477 to 0.534.
Table A.1
If the IT model were constructed in first differences, which means that we
were interested only in the direction of the changes of the endogenous variables, then
this whole exercise would not matter. But since we know that monetary policy targets
are set in level, a positive or negative output gap can mean 1% or 2% percent
difference in inflation via a Phillips Curve and 1% or 2% higher interest rates via any
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTPUT GAP (HODRICK-PRESCOTT FILTER WITH DIFFERENT TIME SPAN)
ADJUSTED SAMPLE: 1995.I - 2000.I
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CONSTANT -0.012 33.5% -0.011 36.0% -0.015 21.5%
OUTPUT GAP(-1) 0.524 2.6% 0.517 2.8% 0.468 4.7%
OUTPUT GAP(-2) -0.004 98.8% -0.006 97.8% -0.015 94.9%
REAL INTEREST RATE(-1) 0.480 3.5% 0.477 3.5% 0.525 1.9%
PSBR -0.149 36.4% -0.138 40.1% -0.207 20.4%
DUMMY1 0.014 12.4% 0.014 11.9% 0.016 9.1%
DUMMY2 -0.045 0.2% -0.045 0.2% -0.041 0.4%


































DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTPUT GAP (LINEAR TREND WITH DIFFERENT TIME SPAN)
ADJUSTED SAMPLE: 1995.I - 2000.I
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CONSTANT -0.009 48.5% -0.008 55.3% -0.015 21.2%
OUTPUT GAP(-1) 0.629 1.2% 0.647 1.1% 0.484 3.9%
OUTPUT GAP(-2) 0.072 76.4% 0.097 69.0% -0.002 99.1%
REAL INTEREST RATE(-1) 0.511 3.9% 0.517 4.0% 0.534 1.8%
PSBR -0.219 22.3% -0.215 23.7% -0.244 14.2%
DUMMY1 0.012 21.2% 0.012 22.8% 0.015 9.8%
DUMMY2 -0.052 0.1% -0.054 0.1% -0.042 0.3%
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kind of Taylor Rule. So the appropriate calibration of the zero output gap level
can make the difference between reaching or not the targeted inflation or even
between growth and stagnation.
APPENDIX 2: FORWARD LOOKING PHILLIPS CURVE
The lack of a survey on market expectations on the inflation rate since the beginning
of the Real Plan imposes a major problem on the estimation of a Forward Looking
Phillips Curve. In Table A.2 we present the estimates with different restrictions
considering as the expected inflation the fitted value of a linear projection of inflation
on the available information, including lagged values of the exchange rate. Once
again, negativity restriction on the output gap elasticity is made necessary. When this
restriction is imposed, the exchange rate pass-through to inflation obtained is 0.085,
which falls in the range presented in Table 3.
Table A.2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INFLATION (PHILLIPS CURVE FORWARD LOOKING)
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
INFLATION(-1) 0.390 1.7% 0.411 0.6% 0.423 5.5%
EXPECTED INFLATION(1) 0.602 2.1% 0.536 0.1% 0.292 36.6%
OUTPUT GAP(-1) 0.076 42.4% 0.060 45.8% -0.326 -


























APPENDIX 3: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS
Table A.3
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1994:3 1999:4
Lags: 4
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat. P-value
  OUTPUT GAP does not Granger Cause PRICES 18  3.378  0.059
  PRICES does not Granger Cause OUTPUT GAP  0.778  0.566
  INTEREST RATE does not Granger Cause PRICES 18  0.813  0.547
  PRICES does not Granger Cause INTEREST RATE  0.154  0.956
  PSBR does not Granger Cause PRICES 18  2.187  0.151
  PRICES does not Granger Cause PSBR  0.754  0.579
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause PRICES 17  8.165  0.006
  PRICES does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE  0.861  0.526
  INTEREST RATE does not Granger Cause OUTPUT GAP 18  4.849  0.023
  OUTPUT GAP does not Granger Cause INTEREST RATE  3.196  0.068
  PSBR does not Granger Cause OUTPUT GAP 18  0.550  0.703
  OUTPUT GAP does not Granger Cause PSBR  2.294  0.138
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause OUTPUT GAP 17  0.454  0.767
  OUTPUT GAP does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE  0.595  0.676
  PSBR does not Granger Cause INTEREST RATE 18  0.295  0.873
  INTEREST RATE does not Granger Cause PSBR  2.077  0.166
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause INTEREST RATE 17  1.844  0.213
  INTEREST RATE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE  0.995  0.462
  EXCHANGE RATE does not Granger Cause PSBR 17  1.511  0.286
  PSBR does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE RATE  0.905  0.504
Granger causality tests were run on the data to obtain evidence on the IT
model’s transmission mechanisms. We have good evidence that INTEREST RATE
Granger causes OUTPUT GAP, followed by evidence that OUTPUT GAP Granger
causes PRICES. We have also strong evidence that EXCHANGE RATE causes
PRICES.24
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